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Abstract:
Purpose: Preventive lateral transshipment can respond to customers who will choose a
substitute or to give up when the product is out of  stock. Motivated by the common practice, a
decision-making model of  preventive lateral transshipment with multi selling periods is
developed. The purpose of  the paper is to explore the optimal preventive lateral transshipment
policy with multi selling periods.
Design/methodology/approach: With a discrete-time dynamic programming model, we take
a dynamic programming approach and adopt backward induction to analyze two retailers’
preventive lateral transshipment policy.
Findings: The optimal preventive lateral transshipment policy is a threshold policy which
depends on both the remaining selling periods and inventory level. The above properties ensure
that two retailers can control inventory with preventive lateral transshipment.
Practical implications: The retailer can adjust inventory via the threshold type policy. The
simple decision rule which compares on-hand inventory level with the critical inventory level
can be used to control inventory by preventive lateral transshipment.
Originality/value: A discrete-time decision-making model of preventive lateral transshipment
policy is formulated. This model takes consideration of  multi selling periods, which is different
from most existing researches on preventive lateral transshipment.
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1. Introduction
Customers’ request for higher product variety in perishable product categories intensifies the
uncertainty of supply and demand for the market (Mahto & Kumar, 2008; Chen & Zhang,
2010). As a result, perishable products are often out of stock or overstock. To cope with this
problem, some retailers try to adopt the reactive lateral transshipment and achieve the so-
called “risk-pooling” effect. However, there are some limitations when the reactive lateral
transshipment serves as an important tool in response to customer need. For example, a
survey of more than 71,000 customers showed that customers have little patience for
stock-outs, and 85% of them will choose a substitute or to give up when they cannot find the
precise products they are looking for (Gruen & Corsten, 2004). Reactive lateral transshipment
might fail to reply to customers who have little patience for stock-outs. While some leading
fashion enterprises, e.g. ZARA and H&M, try to adopt preventive lateral transshipment to
reduce stock losses (Caro, Gallien, Díaz, & García, 2010; Sen, 2008). In such situations,
preventive lateral transshipment provides t h e retailer with more opportunities to control
inventory after the selling season begins. In this case, a portion of demand was observed in
advance, which might reduce some risk of stock-out or overstock and can achieve a "win-win"
situation.
When the selling season includes two or more periods, the retailer can implement preventive
lateral transshipment in response to the risk of stock-out or overstock. For example,
representative published work by Lee and Whang (2002) considered a system of multi
retailers, and obtained the optimal lateral transshipment policy. Rong, Snyder and Sun (2010)
adopted a two-period model and proved the optimal transshipment policy is composed of the
transship-down-to level and the transship-up-to level. Extending this, Summerfield and Dror
(2012) introduced a general framework of decision-making of two periods and summarized the
policy of preventative lateral transshipment. In addition, research by Seidscher and Miner
(2013) established a cost optimization model and showed the optimal transshipment is
composed of hold back levels. However, the above literatures focused on the two-period model
of preventative lateral transshipment. In practice, the retailer can implement preventive lateral
transshipment more times. Furthermore, Agrawal, Chao and Seshadri (2004) found that, as
the number of opportunities for transshipping increases, the retailer may get more profit.
Therefore, some researchers tried to transfer attention from two periods to more periods. To
address these questions, Zhao, Ryan and Deshpande (2008) developed a cost-minimization
model by adopting discrete event dynamic programming and demonstrated that the optimal
transship-up-to level is decreasing in inventory level. Alternatively, Paterson, Teunter and
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Glazebrook (2012) presented an optimal policy which is a function of cost as a correction for
the expected cost. Glazebrook, Paterson, Rauscher and Archibald (2014) proposed hybrid
transshipments to prevent future shortages and developed an easy-to-compute heuristic for
determining which transshipment should be adopted. In addition, Seidscher and Minner (2013)
formulated an optimal threshold function for a preventive lateral transshipment, and
demonstrated the threshold function is monotonic function of transshipment costs,
warehousing costs and stock losses. Roodbergen (2013) established a cost optimization model
by the stochastic dynamic programming method and got the optimal transshipment quantity.
Similarly, Yousuk and Luong (2013) stated the properties for the optimal transship-up-to level
and transship-down-to level in a replenishment cycle by adopting the optimization objective
function. Tai and Ching (2014) presented a two-echelon inventory system consists of a supply
plant with infinite capacity and proposed an aggregated inventory model for the central
warehouse and the local warehouses. Meanwhile, Liu and Liang (2013) studied the medical
resources allocation problem in a discrete time-space network model, and got the optimal
allocation of medical resources by a proactive mechanism. Although they converted attention
from two periods to more selling periods, they still focused on the transshipment which has
only been implemented one time at each replenishment cycle. However, in practice, some
products cannot be replenished two times (or more), especially for perishable products. Taking
this path, Çömez, Stecke and Çakanyıldırım (2012) developed an optimal holdback policy for
two retailers in a multi-period model and proved that the policy is characterized by the
transship-down-to level. However, the prerequisite is that one retailer is stocked out, while
another has excess inventory, which cannot fully reflect the characteristic of preventive lateral
transshipment to reduce the risk of future stock-out. So, in order to avoid the risk of stock-out
or overstock, the retailer has to transship in product before his inventory level drops to zero.
With respect to the literatures in this article, instead, we focus on a discrete-time model of two
retailers when customers have little patience for stock-outs. A key feature of our model is that
the transship-up-to level and the transship-down-to level change with the remaining selling
periods and the two retailers’ inventory status. So, the existence of the two thresholds is
proved. Based on the existence, we will also prove that the optimal transshipment control
policy is a threshold type and the structural properties of two thresholds are obtained. Finally,
With regards to the complex nature of the optimal policy, we propose the corresponding
solutional algorithm by the structural properties of the thresholds.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In view of above questions, this article is
divided into 5 sections. The description and notations are presented and the discrete-time
dynamic programming mode framework is developed in Section 2. Next, we will show the
existence of the transship-up-to level and the transship-down-to level and get the properties of
the threshold function in Section 3. Based on the properties of the thresholds, the
corresponding solution algorithm is proposed in the Section 4. We will present a numerical
study in Section 5. In Section 6, we conclude our findings.
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2. Problem description and model
2.1. Problem description and assumptions
In this section, we consider a system consisting of two retailers who sell a same kind of
perishable products during the selling season. Each of them faces an independent market.
Before the selling season, retailer i gets a inventory level of size Qi with unit cost w, where
I = 1, 2. There is no replenishment during the whole selling season after the season begins
because the procurement lead time is long. The selling horizon is finite, and be divided into
N periods of equal length. In this time discretization, the periods are short enough so that
there can be at most one unit demand within each period, either at retailer 1 or 2, or neither.
I n each period, a demand arrives at retailers 1 and 2 as a homogeneous Poisson process
with arrival rate λ1 and λ2, respectively, where 0 ≤ λ1 + λ2 ≤ 1. Following the general
assumptions in the published works, each arriving customer is assumed to purchase at most
one unit of the product. When a demand arrives at retailer i and there is no positive on-hand
inventory, the customer is unwilling to delay purchase. The number of periods remaining
until the end of the selling season is denoted by k, k = N, N –1,...,1, and the products
ordered by retailers arrive at period k = N. The sequence of events at the selling period k is
illustrated as follows.
Step 1. At the beginning of period k, one unit of product transshipped in at the previous period
arrives.
Step 2. At period k, upon a demand at retailer i, if there is positive on-hand inventory, it earns
a per-unit selling price pi, which remains unchanged during the entire selling season.
Otherwise, a per-unit shortage cost mi is incurred.
Step 3. After Step 2, the transshipment decision whether to transship in one unit of product
from retailer j, j = 3 – i, must be made. One unit of product arrives at retailer i with the
transshipment cost ct before the next selling period begins if the transshipment is necessary.
Transshipment cost includes the transportation cost, as well as any other administrative costs
associated with transshipment.
Step 4. If there is excess inventory at the end of selling season, i.e., k = 1, then excess
inventory is salvaged with a unit salvage value of si.
2.2. Mathematical model
A dynamic programming model is developed to explore the optimal policy of preventive lateral
transshipment to solve the problem described above. When the initial inventory Q1 and Q2 are
exogenous, a three-dimensional vector is defined to characterize the inventory levels and the
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remaining selling periods. The transshipment decision must be made after a demand is realized
regardless of whether there is a demand within each period except f o r period 1. The
formulation for this process can be expressed as follows:
vk(x1, x2) = λ1H1vk–1(x1, x2) + λ2H2vk–1(x1, x2) + (1 – λ1 – λ2)H3vk–1(x1, x2) (1)
vk(x1, x2) represents the expected system profit over k selling periods, given current inventory
level (x1, x2), with x1, x2 indicating the inventory level for retailer 1,2, and 0 ≤ x1 ≤ Q1,
0 ≤ x2 ≤ Q2. Considering all of the possible events that might happen during the entire selling
season, we have three events. One unit of demand arrives either at retailer 1 or 2, or neither.
H1vk–1(x1, x2), H2vk–1(x1, x2), and H3vk–1(x1, x2) are the expected profit operators of three events
respectively, and defined by (2)~(4).
(2)
(3)
(4)
The formula (2) represents the expected profit when a demand arrives at retailer 1 with arrival
rate λ1 at selling period k, where h1, h2, is the unit holding cost per unit of selling period. The
transshipment decision is whether to transship in one unit of product from retailer 2 after one
unit o f demand is fulfilled. For x1 ≥ 1, x2 ≥ 1, and when the inequality vk–1(x1 – 1, x2) ≤
vk- 1(x1, x2 – 1) – ct – h1 + h2 holds, transshipping in one unit of product is optimal from retailer
2. For x1 = 0, x2 ≥ 1, and the inequality - ct – h1 + h2 + vk–1(x1 + 1, x2 – 1) ≥ vk–1(x1, x2),
transshipping in one unit of product is necessary from retailer 2. For x2 = 0, retailer 1 neither
transships in nor out one unit of product. Formula (3) and (4) are illustrated analogously.
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For k = 1, the excess inventory is salvaged besides the sale, and the expected profit of retailer
1 is as follows:
(5)
3. Analysis of model of preventive lateral transshipment
3.1. Performance of preventive lateral transshipment
Two retailers do not influence each other when there is no preventive lateral transshipment.
So, the expected profit at period k is as follow:
(6)
where
(7)
(8)
The formula (7) represents the expected profit at period k when a customer arrives at retailer
1. The formula (8) represents the profit when customer arrives at retailer 2. The question is
whether two retailers can get more profits with preventive lateral transshipment than without
it. So, we have the following theorem 1.
Theorem 1. More profit can be collected with preventive lateral transshipment than without it
under the condition of equal initial inventory.
Proof. For k = 1, there is no transshipment. So, vkN(x1, x2) = vk(x1, x2) holds from formula (5).
For k = 2, we need to prove v2(x1, x2) – v2N(x1, x2) ≥ 0 by the induction. For x1 ≥ 1, the
inequality max{v1(x1 – 1, x2), – ct + v1(x1, x2 – 1) – h1 + h2} ≥ v1N(x1 – 1, x2) always holds. For
x1 = 0, the inequality max{v1(x1, x2), – ct + v1(x1 + 1, x2 – 1) – h1 + h2} ≥ v1N(x1, x2) holds.
Overall, for k = 2, we can prove v2(x1, x2) – v2N(x1, x2) ≥ 0. For k ≥ 3, we need to prove that
the inequality vk(x1, x2) – vkN(x1, x2) ≥ 0 holds. When x1 ≥ 1, we can prove the inequality
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max{vk–1(x1 – 1, x2) – h2, – ct + vk–1(x1, x2 – 1) – h1} ≥ (x1 – 1, x2) – h2 always holds by the
induction. Similarly, we can prove the second term and the third term. When x1 = 0, the
inequality vk(x1, x2) – vkN(x1, x2) ≥ 0 holds.
Theorem 1 indicates that two retailers can collect more profit when the preventive lateral
transshipment policy is adopted. Two retailers can control inventory by transshipping in or
transshipping out products even if no demand arrives.
3.2. Analysis of policy of preventive lateral transshipment
At each period, transshipment decision must be made after a demand is realized except for
period 1. For x1 = Q1, retailer 1 cannot transship in product. Similarly, for x1 = 0, transshipping
out one unit of product from retailer 1 cannot be implemented. A control policy of the system
specifies the transship-up-to level and the transship-down-to level of the system at any period
and any inventory state. Therefore, a simple decision rule composed of the critical inventory
levels of the transship-up-to level and the transship-down-to level is developed, and the critical
inventory level is calculated and stored in advance. So, the retailers can control preventive
lateral transshipment by comparing on-hand inventory level with the critical inventory level
stored in advance. So, we have the following theorem 2. Without loss of generality, we focus
our analysis on retailer 1.
Theorem 2. For k ≥ 2, for the inventory of retailer 2, x2 ϵ {1, 2, …, Q2}, there exist some
transship-up-to levels ITk(x2) ϵ {0, 1, …, Q1 –1} for retailer 1. Similarly, for the inventory of
retailer 2 x2 ϵ {0,1, …, Q2 –1}, there exist some transship-down-to levels OTk(x2) ϵ {1, 2,
…, Q1 –1, Q1} for retailer 1. ITk(x2) and OTk(x2) can be obtained from formula (9) and (10).
ITk(x2) = max{x1: vk(x1 + 1, x2) – vk(x1, x2 + 1) ≥ ct + h1 – h2} (9)
OTk(x2) = min{x1: vk(x1, x2 + 1) – vk(x1 + 1, x2) ≥ ct + h2 – h1} (10)
Proof. Let gk(x1, x2) = vk(x1 + 1, x2) – vk(x1, x2 + 1), and we need to prove the gk(x1, x2) is
non-increasing in x1 by the induction. When k = 2, we can prove the inequality v2(x1 + 2, x2) –
v2(x1 + 1, x2 + 1) – v2(x1 + 1, x2) + v2(x1 + 1, x2) ≤ 0 holds by formula (5). When k ≥ 3, and
x1 = 0, x2 = 0 holds, Δg1,k(0, 0) = vk(1, 1) – vk(0, 2) – vk(1, 0) + vk(0, 1). We follow Zhuang and
Li (2010) to prove the inequality Δg1,k(0, 0) ≤ 0 holds. When x1 = 0, x2 ≥ 1, x1 = 1, x2 ≥ 0 and
x1 ≥ 1, x2 ≥ 1, we also can prove that the inequality Δg1,k(x1, x2) ≤ 0 holds by the induction.
Therefore, there exist the transship-up-to level ITk(x2) and the transship-down-to level OTk(x2).
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Theorem 2 indicates that the transship-down-to level and the transship-up-to level are used to
determine whether inventory should be transshipped between the retailers or not. For the
inventory level of retailer 2 within each period, there exist some critical inventory thresholds,
which at most divide the set {0, 1, …, Q1} into three subsets. In the first subset, where the
inventory is below the transship-up-to level, retailer 1 can increase the inventory to the
threshold by transshipping in products. In the second subset, where the inventory lies between
the band defined by the transship-up-to level and the transship-down-to level, retailer 1 does
nothing. In the third subset, where the inventory is above the transship-down-to level, retailer
1 can reduce the inventory to the threshold by transshipping out products. Therefore, two
retailers can control inventory by transshipping in or out products, and we have the following
theorem 3.
Theorem 3. For k ≥ 2, in each selling period, it is optimal for retailer 1 to transship in one unit
of product from retailer 2 if the inventory of retailer 2 satisfies the condition OTk(x1) ≤ x2 ≤ Q2.
When the inequality 0 ≤ x2 ≤ ITk(x1) holds, retailer 1 transships out one unit of product to
retailer 2. Otherwise, both retailers do nothing.
Proof. When the inequality OTk(x1) ≤ x2 ≤ Q2 holds, we can obtain the inequality vk(x1, x2 + 1)
– h2 ≤ ct + vk(x1 + 1, x2) – h1. Following formula (9) and the inequality Δg2,k(x1, x2) ≤ 0, we
can prove the inequality max{x1: vk(x1 + 1, x2) – vk(x1, x2 + 1) ≥ - ct + h2 – h1} ≤ ITk(x2)
holds. Therefore, it is optimal for retailer 1 to transship in one unit of product from retailer 2.
Similarly, when the inequality 0 ≤ x2 ≤ OTk(x1) holds, it is optimal for retailer 1 to transship out
one unit of product from retailer 2.
Theorem 3 demonstrates that, the simple decision rule by comparing on-hand inventory level
with the critical inventory level can be used to control preventive lateral transshipment
between the retailers. Moreover, the critical inventory level makes up the threshold type policy
which is composed of the transship-up-to level and the transship-down-to level from theorem
2. Toward the characterization of the optimal transshipment policy, it is necessary to further
obtain the structural properties of the thresholds in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Fo r k ≥ 3, the transship-down-to level OTk(x2) is non-decreasing in the
remaining periods and the transship-up-to level ITk(x2) is non-increasing in the remaining
periods during the rest of the selling period.
Proof. For k = 3, we have OT2(x2) ≤ OT3(x2). When k ≥ 4 holds, we assume the induction
hypothesis holds. When x1 = 0, OTk–1(x2) = OTk(x2) = 0 holds, and OTk–1(x2) ≤ OTk(x2) holds via
the hypothesis. When x1 ≥ 1, x2 = 0, the equality OTk–1(0) = min{OTk(0): vk–1(OTk(0), x2 + 1) –
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vk–1(OTk(0) + 1, x2) ≥ ct + h2 – h1} holds from (10). Therefore, we have OTk–1(0) ≤ OTk(0).
Overall, when x1 ≥ 1, x2 = 0, the inequality OTk(0) ≥ OTk–1(0) holds. Similarly, when x1 ≥ 1,
x2 ≥ 1, the inequality OTk–1(x2) ≤ OTk(x2) holds. Overall, the inequality OTk–1(x2) ≤ OTk(x2)
holds. Similarly, the inequality ITk–1(x2) ≥ ITk(x2) holds. 
Proposition 1 indicates that, two retailers do not tend to implement transshipment as a result
of the higher transship-down-to level and lower transship-up-to level earlier during the selling
season. On the contrary, two retailers tend to implement transshipment when there are less
remaining periods. Two retailers do not worry that they cannot implement transshipment as
long as they satisfy the condition of transshipment. It is different from two independent
retailers because two retailers always cooperate to balance the inventory, while two
independent retailers always maximizes her/his own profit.
Proposition 2. For k ≥ 2, both the transship-up-to level ITk(x2) and the transship-down-to
level OTk(x2) are non-decreasing in the inventory of retailer 2.
Proof. Recall that inequality Δg1,k(x1, x2) ≤ 0 holds. Following Zhuang and Li (2010), we can
prove the inequality Δg2,k(x1, x2) ≥ 0 holds by the induction. So, we can obtain ITk(x2 + 1) ≥
ITk(x2) and the inequality OTk(x2 + 1) ≥ OTk(x2) from formula (9) and (10).
Proposition 2 demonstrates when the gap of the inventory of two retailers is wider, both
retailers tend to balance the inventory. Specifically, when the inventory of retailer 2 is
relatively low, in order to balance the inventory, the relatively low transship-down-to level of
retailer 1 encourages more transshipment from retailer 1 to retailer 2. Meanwhile, the
relatively low transship-up-to level of retailer 1 avoids more transshipment from retailer 2 to
retailer 1. This is different from the case when two retailers are independent, because they
may fight against each other if the gap of the inventory of two retailers is wider. Similarly, we
can get corresponding managerial insights when the inventory level of retailer 2 is relatively
high.
4. Algorithm
In the previous sections, we proved that t w o retailers can control preventive lateral
transshipment by the transship-up-to level and the transship-down-to level. However, the
thresholds depend on both retailers’ inventory states and the remaining periods. The value
iteration algorithm is applied intensively as initial inventory level and the selling periods
increase. Therefore, in this section we will develop a convenient algorithm based on the
structural properties of the thresholds from Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. Given initial
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inventory Q1 and Q2, ITk(x2) and OTk(x2) can be obtained via formula (1), (9) and (10). Without
loss of generality, the algorithm for retailer 1 is as follows.
Step 1. Initialize x1 = Q1 and x2 = Q2.
Step 2. Calculate the profit vk(x1, x2) under all states by formula (1)~(5), and go to Step 3.
Step 3. Set x2 = 1 and x1 = Q1 – 1. If vk(x1 + 1, x2 – 1) – vk(x1, x2) ≥ ct + h1 – h2 holds, then
set ITk(1) = Q1 – 1, and go to Step 4. Otherwise, go to Step 5.
Step 4. Set x1 = x1 and x2 = x2 + 1. If the inequality vk(x1 + 1, x2) – vk(x1, x2 + 1) ≥ ct + h1 – h2
holds, then set ITk(x2 + 1) = x1. Repeat Step 4 until x2 = Q2 holds. Otherwise, go to Step 6.
Step 5. Set x2 = x2 and x1 = x1 – 1. If the inequality vk(x1, x2 – 1) – vk(x1 – 1, x2) ≥ ct + h1 – h2
holds, then set ITk(1) = x1 – 1. Repeat Step 5 until x1 – 0 holds. Otherwise, go to Step 6.
Step 6. Set x1 = x1 – 1 and x2 = x2 + 1. If the inequality vk(x1, x2) – vk(x1 – 1, x2 + 1) ≥ ct + h1 – h2
holds, then set ITk(x2 + 1) = x1 – 1, and go to step 4. Otherwise, return to Step5.
The calculation of OTk(x2) may refer to Step 3~Step 6.
5. Computational experiment
In this section, a computational experiment to supplement the analytical results is further
provided. The experiment will explore the existence of transshipment area of two retailers and
analyze the impact of the transshipment cost, shortage cost, and salvage value on
transshipment and profit. The base parameters used in the computational experiment are as
follows. p1 = p2 = 40, ct = 2, w = 20, s1 = s2 = 5, m1 = m2 = 10, h1 = 0.5, h2 = 0.2, λ1 = 0.2
and λ2 = 0.1.
5.1. Region of preventive lateral transshipment 
The optimal policy is computed by the algorithm from Section 4, and presented in Figure 1. As
shown in Figure 1, both the transship-up-to level and transship-down-to level are non-
decreasing in the inventory of retailer 2. Only in Area Ⅰ and Area Ⅱ, the preventive
transshipment occurs, and no transshipment occurs in Area Ⅲ. As transshipment cost
increases, both the area of transshipping in and transshipping out decrease because marginal
profit by transshipment gets lower.
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(a) ct = 2 (b) ct = 5 (c) ct = 8
Figure 1. Region of preventive lateral transshipment 
In Area I, retailer 2 transships in products from retailer 1. In Area II, retailer 1 transships in
products from retailer 2. In Area III, there exists no transshipment. No matter which retailer a
demand arrives at, the inventory of retailer 1 decreases when the inventory state of two
retailers falls in Area I. When a demand arrives at retailer 1, she immediately satisfies the
customer’s demand if she has available on-hand inventory. So, the inventory of retailer 1
decreases. When a demand arrives at retailer 2, he transships in one unit from retailer 1,
which also makes her inventory decrease. Similarly, no matter which retailer a demand arrives
at, the inventory of retailer 2 decreases when the inventory state of two retailers falls in Area
II.
5.2. Impact of transshipment cost on transshipment and profit
Under the selling period k = 40 and the inventory level of retailer 2 x2 = 6, the impact of
transshipment cost on transshipment and profit is as Figure 2 and Figure 3 show.
As transshipment cost increases, the threshold of transship-up-to level keeps unchanged, and
the transship-down-to level increases.
As transshipment cost increases, the threshold of transship-up-to level keeps unchanged
because the inventory level of retailer 2 is relatively high compared with the initial ordering
quantity. Moreover, both retailers face more remaining sale periods. Therefore, the two factors
which lead to the lower threshold of transship-up-to level prevent the occurrence of
transshipment.
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The transship-down- t o l e ve l increases because the expected profit collected from
transshipment decreases as transshipment cost increases. When transshipment cost is small,
the expected marginal profit with transshipment is high, which makes the transship-down-to
level be lower. However, as transshipment cost increases further, the expected profit collected
by the preventive lateral transshipment decreases, and the transship-up-to level increases
accordingly.
Figure 2. Relation between transshipment and transshipment cost
As transshipment cost increases, t h e profit with transshipment decreases, and the gap
between the profit with transshipment and that without transshipment narrows.
When transshipment cost increases from 0 to 15, profit with transshipment decreases from
116.1 to 78.3, while profit without transshipment keeps unchanged. Moreover, profit with
transshipment is always greater than without it. With a lower transshipment cost, a higher
expected profit level can be collected by implementing transshipment. Therefore, both retailers
choose to transship in order to get more profit. As transshipment cost increases further, the
transshipment gets more and more difficult, which makes the expected profit collected by
transshipping get less.
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Figure 3. Relation between profit and transshipment cost
5.3. Impact of shortage cost on transshipment and profit
Under the selling period k = 40 and the inventory level of retailer 2 x2 = 6, the impact of
shortage cost on transshipment and profit is as Table 1 shows.
As shortage cost increases, the transship-up-to level a n d transship-down-to level keep
unchanged. As shortage cost increases, the value of preventive transshipment gets larger and
larger. Therefore, the transship-down-to level needs to be set lower. Because transshipment
time is zero, it is optimal to keep at most one unit product. Two factors make the transship-up-
to level and transship-down-to level to be insensitive to the shortage cost.
Shortage
cost
Transship-up-to
level
Transship-down-to
level
Profit with
transshipment
Profit without
transshipment Profit increment
0 1 4 109.9332 78.719 31.2142
1 1 4 109.0927 77.1579 31.9348
2 1 4 108.2811 75.5967 32.6844
3 1 4 107.4853 74.0356 33.4497
4 1 4 106.7188 72.4745 34.2443
5 1 4 105.9664 70.9133 35.0531
6 1 4 105.2308 69.3522 35.8786
7 1 4 104.5138 67.7911 36.7227
8 1 4 103.8116 66.2299 37.5817
9 1 4 103.1241 64.6688 38.4553
10 1 4 102.4506 63.1077 39.3429
Table 1. Relation between profit, transshipment and shortage cost
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As shortage cost increases, profit with transshipment decreases, but the gap between profit
with transshipment and tha t without transshipment becomes wider. This indicates that
adopting preventive lateral transshipment can get more profit by avoiding the stock-out
compared with the case without transshipment. As shortage cost increases, the value of
preventive transshipment gets larger and larger.
5.4. Impact of salvage value on transshipment and profit
Under the selling period k = 40 and the inventory level of retailer 2 x2 = 8, th e impact of
salvage value on transshipment and profit is as Table 2 shows.
As shortage cost increases, the transship-up-to level a n d transship-down-to level keep
unchanged. The excess inventory is salvaged only at the end of selling period, which makes
salvage value to have less effect on the transship-up-to level and transship-down-to level.
Salvage
value
Transship-up-to
level
Transship-down-to
level
Profit with
transshipment
Profit without
transshipment Profit increment
0 1 4 100.5369 60.6138 39.9231
1 1 4 100.9019 61.1126 39.7893
2 1 4 101.2824 61.6113 39.6711
3 1 4 101.6664 62.1101 39.5563
4 1 4 102.0579 62.6089 39.449
5 1 4 102.4506 63.1077 39.3429
6 1 4 102.8434 63.6064 39.2370
7 1 4 103.2365 64.1052 39.1313
8 1 4 103.7759 64.604 39.1719
9 1 4 104.5476 65.1027 39.4449
10 1 4 105.3487 65.6015 39.7472
11 1 4 106.1499 66.1003 40.0496
12 1 4 106.9511 66.5991 40.352
13 1 4 107.7967 67.0978 40.6989
14 1 4 108.8209 67.5966 41.2243
15 1 4 109.9259 68.0954 41.8305
Table 2. Relation between profit, transshipment and salvage value
As salvage value increases, profit with transshipment increases, and profit with transshipment
i s always greater than that without transshipment. Moreover, when salvage value increases
from 0 to 7 , the gap between profit with transshipment and profit without transshipment
narrows. In fact, retailer 2 can obtain all salvage revenue by transshipment as a result of a
larger gap between two retailers' salvage value. So, the gap narrows. Similarly, when salvage
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value increases from 8 to 15, the gap between profit with transshipment and profit without
transshipment increases.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we considered a system of two retailers with preventive lateral transshipment.
First, we showed the existence of the transship-up-to level and the transship-down-to level.
Second, we demonstrated that the optimal lateral transshipment control policy is a threshold
type. Furthermore, based on the structural properties of the thresholds, the corresponding
algorithm has been proposed as well. Besides, by analyzing the optimal control policy, we
obtained some managerial insights as follows.
1. Two retailers can control the preventive lateral transshipment policy by the transship-up-to
level and the transship-down-to level during the selling season. When a retailer’s inventory is
below the threshold, it is optimal to transship in one unit of product. In contrast, when the
inventory of a retailer is above the threshold, it is optimal to transship out one unit of product.
Otherwise, it is optimal to do nothing.
2. At the beginning of the season, two retailers do not tend to implement transshipment as a
result of the higher transship-down-to level and lower transship-up-to level.
Acknowledgment
This research was supported by Project supported b y Natural Science Foundation of China
under the grant number No. 71272086, and Project supported by the National Science and
Technology Supporting Program of China under the Grant Number 2012BAF12B09. The authors
are also grateful to Dr. Yuyu Li and Dr. Hongyong Fu for insightful discussions.
References
Agrawal, V., Chao, X., & Seshadri, S. (2004). Dynamic balancing of inventory in supply chains.
European Journal of Operational Research, 159(2), 296-317.  
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2003.08.017
Caro, F., Gallien, J., Díaz, M., & García, J. (2010). Zara uses operations research to reengineer
its global distribution process. Interfaces, 40(1), 71-84. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/inte.1090.0472
-695-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1068
Chen, X, & Zhang, J. (2010). Production control and supplier selection under demand
disruptions. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management, 3(3), 421-446.
http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.2010.v3n3.p421-446 
Çömez, N., Stecke, K.E., & Çakanyıldırım, M. (2012). In-season transshipments among
competitive retailers. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 14(2), 290-300.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/msom.1110.0364 
Glazebrook, K., Paterson, C., Rauscher, S., & Archibald, T. (2014). Benefits of hybrid lateral
transshipments in multi-item inventory systems under periodic replenishment. Production
and Operations Management, 23(6), 1-14. 
Gruen, T., & Corsten, D. (2004). Stock-outs cause walkouts. Harvard Business Review, 82(5),
26-27. http://hbr.org/2004/05/stock-outs-cause-walkouts/ar/1
Lee, H., & Whang, S. (2002). The impact of the secondary market on the supply chain.
Management science, 48(6), 719-731.  http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.48.6.719.189 
Liu, M., & Liang, J. (2013). Dynamic optimization model for allocating medical resources in
epidemic controlling. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management, 6(1), 73-88.
http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.663 
Mahto, D., & Kumar, A. (2008). Application of root cause analysis in improvement of product
quality and productivity. Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management, 1(2), 16-53.
http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.2008.v1n2.p16-53
Paterson, C., Teunter, R., & Glazebrook, K. (2012). Enhanced lateral transshipments in a
multi-location inventory system. European Journal of Operational Research, 221(2), 317-327.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2012.03.005
Rong, Y., Snyder, L.V., & Sun, Y. (2010). Inventory sharing under decentralized preventive
transshipments. Naval Research Logistics, 57(6), 540-562.  http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/nav.20420 
Roodbergen, K. (2013). Transshipment and rebalancing policies for library books. European
Journal of Operational Research, 228(2), 447-456.  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2013.02.008
Seidscher, A., & Minner, S. (2013). A Semi-Markov decision problem for proactive and reactive
transshipments between multiple warehouses. European Journal of Operational Research,
230(1), 42-52.  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2013.03.041
Sen, A. (2008). The US fashion industry: A supply chain review. International Journal of
Production Economics, 114(2), 571-593. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2007.05.022 
-696-
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management – http://dx.doi.org/10.3926/jiem.1068
Summerfield, N.S., & Dror, M. (2012). Stochastic programming for decentralized newsvendor
with transshipment. International Journal of Production Economics, 137(2), 292-303.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2012.02.014 
Tai, A., & Ching, W. (2014). Optimal inventory policy for a Markovian two-echelon system with
returns and lateral transshipment. International Journal of Production Economics, 151(1),
48-55. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijpe.2014.01.010
Yousuk, R., & Luong, T. (2013). Modelling a two–retailer inventory system with preventive
lateral transshipment using expected path approach. European Journal of Industrial
Engineering, 7(2), 248-274. http://dx.doi.org/10.1504/EJIE.2013.052571
Zhao, H., Ryan, J., & Deshpande, V. (2008). Optimal dynamic production and inventory
transshipment policies for a two-location make-to-stock system. Operational Research, 56(2),
400-410. http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/opre.1070.0494
Zhuang, W., & Li, Z. (2010). A new method of proving structural properties for certain class of
stochastic dynamic control problems. Operations Research Letters, 38(5), 462-467.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2010.05.008
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management, 2014 (www.jiem.org)
Article's contents are provided on a Attribution-Non Commercial 3.0 Creative commons license. Readers are allowed to copy, distribute
and communicate article's contents, provided the author's and Journal of Industrial Engineering and Management's names are included.
It must not be used for commercial purposes. To see the complete license contents, please visit
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/.
-697-
